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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In recent times, the central question preoccupying contract theory has been the 
relationship between contract law and the moral practice of promising. It is now 
known as the ‘contract and promise’ debate, and it has led to a resurgence of 
interest in contract theory.1 Few comment on this, but this debate has many echoes 
of the ‘Hart-Fuller’ debate on the relationship between law and morality.2  
                                                
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Laws, University College London. This paper was 
originally presented as a response to Michael Freeman’s important critique of 
Balfour v Balfour, on the occasion of a Current Legal Issues Colloquium held in 
his honour at UCL (2013). Since then the aims of the paper have grown, and 
different iterations have been presented at the LSE Private Law Discussion Group 
(2014), the UCL Private Law Group Workshop (2015), and the Cambridge Private 
Law Centre Work in Progress Seminar (2015). Thank you to all of the participants 
on these occasions, and to the two anonymous referees from this journal, for 
invaluable advice and feedback, which has led to important revisions. I would like 
to thank in particular for their comments: Alison Diduck, Charles Fried, Amy 
Goymour, Greg Klass, George Letsas, Nick McBride, Ben McFarlane, Joanna 
Miles, Chris Mills, Charles Mitchell, Jonathan Morgan, Helen Reece, Rob 
Stevens, Radosveta Vassileva, Emmanuel Voyiakis, Stephen Watterson, Charlie 
Webb, and Fred Wilmot-Smith. Thank you to Simon Palmer and Stuart Sanders 
for their excellent research assistance. The usual caveat applies.   
1 Reflected in this recent collection of essays in the field: G Klass, G Letsas and P 
Saprai (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
2 It took place on the pages of the Harvard Law Review: HLA Hart ‘Positivism 
and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593; L 
Fuller ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 
Harvard Law Review 630. 
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Interest in general jurisprudential questions such as those that concerned 
Herbert Hart and Lon Fuller has waned in recent decades.3 Those questions have 
not gone away. They have resurfaced in other areas. So we have debates about 
whether contract law is based on promise,4 tort on corrective justice,5 unjust 
enrichment on property,6 and so forth. What is the relationship between legal 
rules, doctrines and categories and moral theories and principles? The terrain may 
have shifted, but the battle between positivists and natural lawyers is the same.  
In this paper, I want to focus on just one aspect of the contract and promise 
debate. It has to do with the intent to contract doctrine, which requires for a 
promise or agreement to be enforceable that the parties manifest an intention to 
create a legal relationship. That doctrine, somewhat surprisingly, has received 
relatively little attention in the contract theory literature.7 It is puzzling because 
the existence of the doctrine has played a central role in the arguments of those 
who claim that contract is not based on promise.8 Following Seana Shiffrin, I shall 
call these arguments ‘separatist’ or ‘divisionist’ in nature, and contrast them with 
the view she calls ‘reflective’, according to which contract law mirrors, or at least 
                                                
3 There are complicated reasons for this, which I won’t speculate on here. Not 
least of them though must be that some of the leading players in this drama have 
now left the stage.  
4 S Shiffrin ‘The Divergence of Contract and Promise’ (2007) 120 Harvard Law 
Review 708; J Kraus ‘The Correspondence of Contract and Promise’ (2009) 109 
Columbia Law Review 1603.   
5 E Weinrib The Idea of Private Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, rev edn, 
2012).  
6 C Webb Reason and Restitution: A Theory of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016). 
7 Gregory Klass’s work is a notable exception, see his ‘Three Pictures of Contract: 
Duty, Power, and Compound Rule’ (2008) 83 New York University Law Review 
1726, and ‘Intent to Contract’ (2009) 95 Virginia Law Review 1437. 
8 See for example: R Barnett ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 Columbia 
Law Review 269 at 304; R Barnett ‘Contract Is Not Promise; Contract is Consent’ 
in G Klass, G Letsas and P Saprai (eds), above n 1, p 42 at pp 48-50; D Kimel 
From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003) pp 136-142. 
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should mirror, the moral norms of promising.9 For the divisionist, the aim of 
contract law is not to enforce promissory morality, but rather to achieve other 
ends or goals, such as promoting efficient exchange.10  
The intent to contract doctrine is important for divisionists, because, they 
argue, it provides a portal between promise and contract. If contracts are 
promises, why have the portal? The doctrine suggests the existence of separate 
domains. 
In what follows, I set out the doctrine and show how Balfour v Balfour, the 
case that brought intent to contract into existence, encouraged divisionist thinking, 
with, as feminists have shown, damaging consequences for women.11 I shall 
explore the arguments of Dori Kimel, who has offered a particularly sophisticated 
defence of the role that intent to contract plays in separating contract from 
promise. I hope to show some of the weaknesses in his view. They rest, I believe, 
on a mistaken understanding of freedom, according to which the value of freedom 
resides in detachment.12 Following Fuller, I will show that the exact opposite is 
true; freedom depends on attachment to others. With this view of freedom in 
                                                
9 See Shiffrin (2007), above n 4, at 713, and S Shiffrin ‘Are Contracts Promises?’ 
in Andrei Marmor (ed) The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (New 
York: Routlegde, 2012) p 241 at pp 250-256. These views do not necessarily 
entail particular commitments about the nature of law. So, for example, a 
positivist could take a reflective approach by claiming that contract law should 
(not necessarily does) aim to mirror the norms of promissory morality. Likewise, 
a natural lawyer might take a divisionist approach, by arguing that although moral 
norms play a role in identifying contract law, they are not promissory in nature. 
Nevertheless, positivism tends to gravitate towards the divisionist position, and 
natural law towards the reflective.  
10 See Shiffrin (2007), above n 4, at 713. 
11 Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571. 
12 Tangled up in the contract and promise debate are questions not only about the 
nature of law, but also debates about the proper limits of the state and the 
enforcement of morality. See Shiffrin (2007), above n 4, at 713; Barnett (2014), 
above n 8, p 47: ‘… by justifying contract as a species of enforcing purely moral 
commitments, it seems tantamount to enforcing virtue’.  
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place, it is possible to see how intent to contract might fit within a reflective view 
of the relationship between contract and promise. The doctrine does not separate 
contract from promise. Rather, it provides a unique way for us to involve 
ourselves with others through promise. 
In the course of my critique of the divisionist view, I will make two central 
claims. First, contra the divisionist, the promise theory can accommodate the 
intent to contract doctrine. Second, that it does so in a way that avoids some of the 
operational pitfalls of the divisionist picture, in particular that the divisionist view 
supports an evidential presumption against the enforcement of promises made in 
the social or domestic context, particularly between spouses, which is unfair on 
women. In light of this, I argue that judges should embrace the reflective 
interpretation of the doctrine, and repudiate their use of the evidential 
presumption.  
How the intent to contract doctrine is interpreted has other potentially far 
reaching doctrinal implications. So for example many argue that consideration is 
merely evidence of the existence of an intent to contract.13 The view we take 
about intent to contract, might affect what we think about consideration. It goes 
beyond the scope of this paper to explore all of these ramifactions; my aims are 
primarily theoretical. However, we should keep in mind that debates about intent 
                                                
13 This view achieved considerable traction after the publication of Lon Fuller’s 
paper ‘Consideration and Form’: (1941) 41 Columbia Law Review 799. There are 
good reasons though to doubt the link between consideration and intent to 
contract, in particular as Mindy Chen-Wishart has argued consideration is neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of intent to contract: 
‘Consideration and Serious Intention’ [2009] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
434 at 441. Furthermore, I tend to agree with Chen-Wishart argument in the same 
paper that consideration has its own rationale in notions of reciprocity (at 450-
455).  
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to contract go to the heart of debates about the nature and purpose of contract law 
and doctrine in general.   
 
2. BALFOUR V BALFOUR 
 
According to intent to contract, an agreement is not legally enforceable unless the 
parties intended for it to be legally binding. The test for intention is an objective 
one, ie, whether a reasonable person would conclude there was such an intention:  
 
The court has to consider what the parties said and wrote in the 
light of all the surrounding circumstances, and then decide whether 
the true inference is that the ordinary man and woman, speaking or 
writing thus in such circumstances, would have intended to create a 
legally binding agreement.14  
 
There is a rebuttable presumption in English law that there is no such intention in 
the case of social or domestic agreements between, for example, friends, parents 
and children, husbands and wives or co-habiting partners.15 The opposite is 
presumed in commercial cases.16  
The doctrine entered English law in the Court of Appeal decision in 
Balfour v Balfour, decided in 1919. The case concerned a married couple. They 
                                                
14 Jones v Padavatton [1969] 2 All ER 616 at 621; Klass (2009), above n 7, at 
1447-1448; J Beatson, A Burrows and J Cartwright Anson's Law of Contract 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 29th edn, 2010) p 71.   
15 Balfour v Balfour at 578-580; Jones v Padavatton at 620; Gould v Gould [1970] 
1 QB 275 at 281; E Peel The Law of Contract (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 13th 
edn, 2011) pp 176-177.  
16 Rose and Frank Co v J R Crompton & Bros Ltd [1923] 2 KB 261 at 288.  
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both lived in Ceylon where the husband worked as Director of Irrigation. In 
November 1915, the husband was granted a period of leave from his work, and 
the couple moved back home to England. The leave ended in August 1916, but 
due to a health condition the wife was unable to return to Ceylon with her 
husband. Before leaving for Ceylon, the husband promised his wife that he would 
pay her £30 per month maintenance until he returned. While away, he wrote to 
say that it would be better for them not to get back together. They divorced, and 
the wife obtained an alimony award. She also sought to enforce the husband’s 
promise to provide maintenance. 
Sargant J upheld the wife’s claim, finding consideration for the husband’s 
promise in the commitment implicitly given by the wife not to rely on his credit 
for necessaries. However, a unanimous Court of Appeal reversed that judgment. 
Warrington LJ and Duke LJ did so mainly because they doubted that the wife 
gave consideration. Atkin LJ, on the other hand, invoked the intention to create 
legal relations doctrine to decide the case, a doctrine that up to that point could 
only be found in the textbooks.17 He reasoned that it was routine for spouses to 
make arrangements such as the one in issue in the case, and that even with 
consideration such agreements should not be legally enforced ‘because the parties 
did not intend that they should be attended by legal consequences’.18 Atkin LJ did 
not, however, conduct a detailed investigation of the facts to ascertain whether 
                                                
17 S Leake The Elements of the Law of Contracts (London: Stevens and Sons, 1st 
edn, 1867) p 9; F Pollock Principles of Contract (London: Stevens and Sons, 1st 
edn, 1876) p 2; W Anson Principles of the English Law of Contract (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1st edn, 1879) p 14. 
18 Balfour v Balfour at 579.  
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such an intention was present.19 Rather, he presumed there was no intention, 
because of the nature of the relationship between the parties: 
 
Agreements such as these are outside the realm of contracts 
altogether. The common law does not regulate the form of 
agreements between spouses. Their promises are not sealed with 
seals and sealing wax. The consideration that really obtains for 
them is that natural love and affection which counts for so little in 
these cold Courts. The terms may be repudiated, varied or renewed 
as performance proceeds or as disagreements develop, and the 
principles of the common law as to exoneration and discharge and 
accord and satisfaction are such as find no place in the domestic 
code. The parties themselves are advocates, judges, Courts, 
sheriff’s officer and reporter. In respect of these promises each 
house is a domain into which the King’s writ does not seek to run, 
and to which his officers do not seek to be admitted.20  
 
Although Balfour and many of the subsequent cases involved disputes 
between husbands and wives, the presumption, as I have mentioned, covers not 
only marital relations, but the domestic or social context more generally, including 
arrangements made between co-habitees, family members and friends.  
As Salmon LJ made clear in the later case Jones v Padavatton, this is a 
factual, not legal, presumption: ‘It derives from experience of life and human 
nature which shows that in such circumstances men and women usually do not 
                                                
19 Klass (2009), above n 7, at 1491.  
20 Balfour v Balfour at 580.  
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intend to create legal rights and obligations, but intend to rely solely on family ties 
of mutual trust and affection’.21  
Whatever the exact status of Atkin LJ’s presumption, and indeed this is an 
issue on which there has been some controversy,22 its effect has been to reinforce 
the sense that contractual and personal relations, like Venice and Belmont, are 
different realms. I allude of course to Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, 
which brings out beautifully the contrast between the worlds of commerce and 
intimacy. Making the same analogy, Roberto Unger describes the difference: 
 
In Venice people make contracts; in Belmont they exchange 
wedding rings. In Venice they are held together by combinations of 
interest, in Belmont by mutual affection. The wealth and power of 
Venice depend upon the willingness of its courts to hold men to 
their contracts. The charm of Belmont is to provide its inhabitants 
with a community in which contracts remain for the most part 
superfluous. Venice is tolerable because its citizens can flee 
occasionally to Belmont and appeal from Venetian justice to 
Belmontine mercy. But the very existence of Belmont presupposes 
                                                
21 [1969] 2 All ER 616 at 621.  
22 Feminists for example have argued that the purpose of the presumption is not 
evidential, but reflects a policy choice by the courts to keep family life private. 
See M Freeman ‘Contracting in the Haven: Balfour v Balfour Revisited’ in R 
Halson (ed) Exploring the Boundaries of Contract (Farnham: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 
1996) p 68 at p 70; M Keyes and K Burns ‘Contract and the Family: Whither 
Intention’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 577 at 595: ‘Reference to 
the intentions of the parties in order to determine the enforceability of an 
agreement, … makes no sense as the parties are unlikely to have considered the 
question. Quite clearly, the requirement of intention is based on a judicial policy 
that contract is “unfamiliar and undesirable” in the family context’ (citing S 
Hedley Restitution: Its Division and Ordering (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
2001) p 76). See similarly S Wheeler and J Shaw Contract Law: Cases, Materials 
and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p 150. 
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the prosperity of Venice, from which the denizens of Belmont gain 
their livelihood.23  
 
Though opposed, Venice and Belmont – commerce and intimacy - depend on each 
other. Commerce makes family life possible, and the family provides a refuge 
from the ‘heartless world’ of the market, where the pursuit of self-interest runs 
wild. 24  As Frances Olsen says: ‘The market is the area for work and the 
production of goods; the family is the arena for most forms of play and 
consumption’.25 In Balfour, Atkin LJ endorsed this division of labour. The result 
was a vision of contract law that regulated trade, but largely stayed out of private 
and family life.26  
 
3. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE 
 
The feminist critique of the Balfour doctrine has been trenchant. The problem is 
with the implications of the doctrine for women, who are still associated with 
roles at home and in family life; in contrast to men, who are identified with the 
market and the world of work.27 In the past, privacy has been used to justify non-
                                                
23 R Unger ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law 
Review 561 at 622-623. For further reflections on the contrast drawn by the play 
and the implications for contract theory see A Brudner ‘Reconstructing Contracts’ 
(1993) 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 1. 
24 I rely here of course on Christopher Lasch’s famous metaphor. C Lasch Haven 
in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged (New York: Basic Books, 1977).  
25 F Olsen ‘The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ 
(1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 1497 at 1564. 
26 Unger, above n 23, at 623.  
27 Olsen, above n 25, at 1576; M Thornton ‘Intention to Contract: Public Act or 
Private Sentiment?’ in N Naffine, R Owens and J Williams (eds) Intention in Law 
and Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001) p 217; Keyes and Burns, above n 22, 
at 578.  
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interference by the state to remedy injustice in the domestic context. As Michael 
Freeman says: ‘The rhetoric of privacy has insulated the female world from the 
legal order and, in doing so, has sent an important ideological message to society. 
It devalues women by saying that they are not important enough to merit legal 
regulation’.28  
This leaves women vulnerable to the exploitation and distributive 
unfairness that result when men break important promises (particularly when 
women rely or confer benefits on the basis of these assurances).29 For reasons of 
economic dependency and social pressure women are often the weaker party in 
intimate relationships.30 These vulnerabilities exist both in the context of marriage 
and co-habitation. Seana Shiffrin has argued that promises perform a role of 
preventing exploitation in situations of power imbalance. Clearly then if the courts 
                                                
28 Freeman, above n 22, p 74. For similar arguments see N Taub and E Schneider 
‘Women's Subordination and the Role of Law’ in D Kairys (ed) The Politics of 
Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Basic Books, 3rd edn, 1998) p 328 at pp 
333-334; and Keyes and Burns, above n 22, at 578, arguing that the presumption 
against contract in domestic settings ‘performs a powerful symbolic function 
delineating the realm of law from the realm of the family and the feminine, 
privileging the former over the latter’.  
29 Arguably the injustice in cases of detrimental reliance or the conferral of 
benefits may be mitigated to some degree by the application of reliance or 
restitution principles. Even though the promisee in these cases may not be able to 
enforce the agreement, and therefore protect her expectation interest, she may in 
cases where she has suffered losses or conferred benefits in reliance on the 
agreement claim compensation for losses suffered or restitution for the gain made 
by the promise-breaker (See Kimel, above n 8, pp 140-141). However, the 
availability of these remedies in English law is severely restricted. Promissory 
estoppel cannot be used as a cause of action (Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215). 
See J Wightman ‘Intimate Relationships, Relational Contract Theory, and the 
Reach of Contract’ (2000) 8 Feminist Legal Studies 93 at 95. For an unjust 
enrichment claim to succeed in this context, there has to be a ‘total failure of 
consideration’, see Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour 
Ltd [1943] AC 32 at 64-65; P Birks An Introduction to the Law of Restitution 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) pp 242-248; F Wilmot-Smith ‘Reconsidering 
“Total” Failure’ (2013) 72 The Cambridge Law Journal 414.   
30 Olsen, above n 25, at 1519-1520.  
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refuse to enforce those promises that may deprive women of what would 
otherwise be an important source of assurance.31  
One might argue that the intent to contract doctrine does not prevent 
women from entering into contracts, and of course that is true, but that does not 
take into account the extent to which the doctrine privileges men over women. As 
Stephen Hedley has pointed out, in most cases, whether in the domestic or 
commercial sphere, parties will not have actively contemplated whether their 
agreement should be legally binding.32 And yet, commercial parties are given a 
presumption that such an intention was present, while the opposite presumption 
applies in the domestic context.  
That presumption against the existence of a contract creates a problem in 
those cases where the parties did intend to create a legal relationship. It places a 
burden on the promisee to show ‘clear and convincing’ evidence that there was a 
manifest intention to be legally bound when the agreement was reached.33 This 
rule puts pressure on the promisee to be as clear as possible at the time of 
agreement that she intends legal enforceability.34  
The trouble is that it may be very difficult for the promisee to achieve this 
level of clarity, and hence satisfy the manifest intent requirement, because being 
                                                
31 S Shiffrin ‘Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism’ (2008) 117 
Philosophical Review 481 at 502-510.  
32  S Hedley ‘Keeping Contract in Its Place - Balfour v Balfour and the 
Enforceability of Informal Agreements’ (1985) 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
391 at 393-395. See also Keyes and Burns, above n 22, at 581, 586-587 and 595.  
33 Gould v Gould [1970] 1 QB 275 at 281.   
34  Gregory Klass distinguishes between rebuttal of the presumption against 
contract on the basis of showing the manifest intention to be legally bound and a 
rule that requires, as a formality, an express statement of an intention to create 
legal relations: Klass (2009), above n 7, at 1468 and 1473-1475. He is right to say 
that from the point of view of legal design these are two different ways of opting 
out of the presumption, with different costs and benefits. However, in practice, I 
suspect that the burden of the manifest intent requirement is so strong that it leads 
de facto to significant pressure on the promisee to make an express statement. 
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clear may involve a relational cost, incurred by the indication to the other party 
that they are not trusted by the promisee to perform.35 This may happen even 
though the parties are operating on the assumption that they are making a legally 
enforceable agreement. As Gregory Klass says, ‘Even where expectations or 
preferences regarding legal liability are mutually understood, those attitudes are 
often better left unspoken’.36 Explicit articulation of those attitudes may evidence 
distrust or an overly litigious tendency that may harm the relationship and scupper 
the agreement.37 Therefore, the promisee is placed in a dilemma by the law. Does 
she make explicit her preference for legal enforceability and risk the relationship 
and the agreement altogether, or does she stay silent and run the risk that the 
agreement is not legally binding? The likelihood is that she will take her chances 
and stay silent, but the danger of that course is that the agreement will not be 
legally binding, and the intentions of the parties not respected by the law.  
A good example of the unfairness that results is the Court of Appeal 
decision in Gould v Gould.38 The case concerned a husband who had separated 
from his wife, leaving her to look after their two children. On breaking up, he 
promised to pay his wife £15 per week maintenance, with the proviso ‘as long as 
he had it’. He failed to keep up with the payments, and his wife sought to enforce 
the promise. The Court of Appeal (with Lord Denning MR dissenting) held that 
there was a presumption against the legal effect of social and domestic 
                                                
35 Ibid, at 1473-1474. 
36 Ibid, at 1474. See also R Gilson, C Sabel and R Scott ‘Braiding: The Interaction 
of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine’ 110 (2010) 
Columbia Law Review 1377 at 1401. 
37 Cf Wightman, above n 29, at 108-109, making the point that it may be a feature 
of intimate relations that agreements are not explicitly spelt out; this may also 
reflect the presence of economic dependency: ‘… the backdrop to the day to day 
informality may be the power that a breadwinner can exert’ (at 109). 
38 [1970] 1 QB 275. 
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arrangements, and that the onus was on the claimant to present ‘clear and 
convincing’ evidence of an intention to create a legal relation to rebut it.39 The 
Court held that the husband’s proviso that he would only pay the maintenance on 
condition that he was able to pay, created a lack of clarity about the terms of the 
agreement, which itself gave the strong indication that the parties did not intend 
legal relations.40  
It is difficult to see here how the Court arrived at the conclusion that there 
was no intention to create a legal relationship.41 The agreement related to a serious 
matter, the parties had separated (unlike in Balfour where the parties were still in 
amity at the time of agreement),42 and there was nothing about the husband’s 
proviso that was particularly unclear or could not have been made clearer by the 
implication of further terms. For example, in his dissent, Lord Denning MR 
implied the term that ‘if the husband found that he could not manage to keep up 
the payments, he could, on reasonable notice, determine the agreement’.43  
 Of course one might reply that all this shows is that sometimes courts fail 
to apply the law correctly; in this case, the facts suggest that the presumption 
should have been rebutted. However, the worry is that the intent to contract 
doctrine, or more specifically, the justification given for it in Balfour reinforces 
the existence of a dichotomy between the role of women in family and 
                                                
39 Ibid, at 281.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Freeman, above n 22, pp 71-72.  
42 Usually where the parties have separated the courts are quick to find an 
intention to contract. Peters’ Executors v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1941] 2 
All ER 620; Merritt v Merritt [1969] 2 All ER 760 at 762: ‘It is altogether 
different when the parties are not living in amity but are separated, or about to 
separate. They then bargain keenly. They do not rely on honourable 
understandings. They want everything cut and dried. It may safely be presumed 
that they intend to create legal relations’ (Lord Denning MR), and 762-763 
(Widgery LJ).  
43 Gould v Gould at 280.  
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commercial life, which prejudices the judiciary in favour of the kind of unfairness 
we see in Gould.   
By not recognising the legal validity of the promise, the Court left the wife 
vulnerable. Furthermore, the judicial reluctance to enforce agreements made in 
domestic settings leads to damaging distributive consequences for women. So for 
example women suffer disproportionality when agreements to perform domestic 
labour are not legally binding, because it is still women predominantly who carry 
out this work.44 Non-intervention perpetuates existing inequalities, and leaves men 
with the power to dominate women.45  
Feminist critiques have shone a light on how this dualism, and the 
domination that results from it, affects the possibilities for human association. 
Women are left dependent on men, and feminists have questioned whether this 
‘makes true love between the sexes difficult, perhaps impossible’.46 Love afterall 
depends on relationships of equality, sharing and respect.47  
These economic and social inequalities that afflict women in particular are 
the source of the vulnerabilities that make the evidential presumption against legal 
enforcement problematic. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to investigate 
whether similar inequalities exist in the context of other relationships covered by 
the presumption, such as gay marriage or those between parents and children. 
However, if it does, then the presumption is likely to have similarly damaging 
                                                
44 J Hasday ‘Intimacy and Economic Exchange’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 
491 at 518-519; Klass (2009), above n 7, at 1494; R Siegel ‘The Modernization of 
Marital Status Law: Adjudication Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930’ (1994) 
82 Georgetown Law Journal 2127 at 2209; Thornton, above n 27. 
45 Olsen, above n 25, at 1510; S Firestone The Dialectic of Sex (New York: 
William Morrow, 1970) pp 142-164. 
46 Olsen, ibid, at 1572. 
47 C Fried Right and Wrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978) pp 
29-30. 
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effects in these contexts too. Therefore, the feminist critique of the doctrine may 
extend beyond the injustices experienced by women.  
It might be objected that the feminist critique of the doctrine that I present 
here is aimed at case law that has been gathering dust. Few cases in recent times 
raise intent to contract issues, and it may be that through developments in family 
law and changes in social and judicial attitudes the kinds of injustices that have 
arisen as a result of the presumption in the past are now of only theoretical interest 
and need no longer detain us. There are reasons though still to worry. First, it is 
not clear that the lack of case law is due to the lack of injustice, or whether the 
existence of injustice is the cause of the lack of case law. Arguably women and 
other vulnerable groups are deterred from bringing cases because of the 
presumption against enforcement and how it has been applied in cases like Gould. 
Second, the existence of the doctrine in the textbooks may carry symbolic or 
expressive significance, reinforcing gender stereotypes and roles, and potentially 
making exploitation by dominant parties more likely. These are genuine costs 
which flow from the failure to repudiate the presumption, and the false dichotomy 
between the domestic and commercial spheres which it both reflects and 
reinforces.  
 
4. THE DIVISIONIST DEFENCE 
 
The feminist critique of the Balfour doctrine has shown how it might unfairly 
impact women, and risk the possibility of intimacy between the sexes. In this 
section, I want to explore a sophisticated divisionist defence of the doctrine.  
 16 
The existence of the doctrine supports the central tenet of the divisionist 
position, which is that contracts and promises are different things. Charles Fried 
famously claimed that contracts are promises.48 But if that is the case, it is 
difficult to explain why making a promise isn’t a sufficient condition for making a 
contract. Why does contract law require, in addition to the making of a promise, a 
separate intention that the parties intended to create a legal relationship? Contract 
law seems to diverge from promise here.49  
Fried’s response seems to be that the requirement exists to ensure that 
promises are made sincerely or seriously: ‘The promisor must have been serious 
enough that subsequent legal enforcement was an aspect of what he should have 
contemplated at the time he promised’.50 The thought appears to be that if the 
promisor contemplated legal enforcement, he must have made his promise 
seriously. The trouble is that if we consider cases like Balfour and Gould, it 
stretches reality to say that when the courts ruled that the parties lacked an 
intention to contract, they doubted the seriousness of the promises that were 
made.51 
It is of course open to the promise theorist to repudiate the Balfour 
doctrine altogether, which is the strategy that Fried adopts with the consideration 
                                                
48 C Fried Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
49 Barnett (1986), above n 8, at 304-305; Barnett (2014), above n 8, p 47 arguing 
that Fried’s theory ‘commits courts to enforcing promissory commitments that the 
parties themselves may never have contemplated as “contractual” or legally 
enforceable…’. 
50 Fried (1981), above n 48, p 38. I follow Kimel’s reading of Fried here. Kimel, 
above n 8, pp 137-138. Fuller gave a similar explanation for the doctrine of 
consideration, by claiming it performed a cautionary function. See his 
‘Consideration and Form’ (1941), above n 13, at 816-817.  
51 Cf Kimel, above n 8, pp 137-138.  
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doctrine.52 The suggestion may not be as radical as it as first appears. Although 
the matter is controversial, there seems to be no intent to contract requirement in 
US contract law. Section 21 of the Second Restatement of Contracts says: 
‘Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential 
to the formation of a contract’. 53  In England, the operation of the factual 
presumption that intent to contract exists in commercial transactions led Patrick 
Atiyah to the view that in the majority of cases ‘no positive intention to enter into 
legal relations needs to be shown’.54  
The difficulties for the reflective position are not then necessarily 
doctrinal. Rather, the greater difficulty is that divisionists provide credible 
explanations for the doctrine. Consider for example the arguments of Dori Kimel.  
Kimel claims that the doctrine promotes two types of valuable freedom, by 
giving parties the right to decide whether to create a legally enforceable 
obligation, rather than a purely moral obligation.  
First, there is freedom from contract, which is valuable because legal 
enforceability might change the relational significance of compliance with 
voluntary undertakings. The making and keeping of promises normally conveys 
the existence of trust and respect in relationships. However, those messages get 
disrupted when promises are made legally enforceable, because promisors are 
given independent reasons to perform, which may either corrupt their motives or 
                                                
52 Fried (1981), above n 48, ch 2.  
53 Randy Barnett rejects the standard interpretation of this section, arguing that it 
only applies in cases where consideration is absent. For Barnett, consideration is 
evidence of the existence of an intent to contract. R Barnett The Oxford 
Introductions to U.S. Law: Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p 
165. See also Klass (2009), above n 7, at 1438, setting out the various exceptions 
to section 21.  
54 P Atiyah An Introduction to the Law of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 5th 
edn, 1995) p 153. Cited by Klass (2009), above n 7, at 1438.  
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create the impression of corruption in the mind of promisees: ‘The availability of 
remedies seriously and manifestly reduces the likelihood that, and at any rate the 
extent to which, a party would benefit from a breach, significantly undermining 
the expressive potential of contractual fidelity’.55 As a result, promise won’t 
convey the attitudes of trust and respect, on which personal relationships hinge.56 
Therefore, parties might choose to do without the added reassurance that legal 
enforceability brings, so as to create an opportunity to express these attitudes, and 
to foster and deepen their relationships.57  
Second, freedom to contract is promoted, in particular where there is an 
absence of trust between the parties. In that context, contract through the 
mechanism of legal enforcement enables the parties to enter into a mutually 
beneficial exchange without being, or having to enter into, a personal relationship 
with one another, thus promoting their freedom to remain detached.58  
Thus, the Balfour doctrine promotes both the values of personal 
attachment and detachment, by giving parties the right to decide whether to steer 
clear of law and depend instead on their personal relationships to secure the 
benefits of co-operative activity, or alternatively to invoke the law and thereby 
avoid having to rely for reassurance on the presence of existing or future personal 
ties. The resonance with Atkin LJ’s justification in Balfour is clear.  
There are problems with both of Kimel’s arguments for the doctrine, and 
with the underlying dichotomy between contract and promise that they reflect and 
defend.  
 
                                                
55 Kimel, above n 8, p 75. 
56 Ibid, p 29 and pp 74-77.  
57 Ibid, p 138. See similarly Chen-Wishart (2009), above n 13, at 452-453.  
58 Kimel, ibid, pp 78-80 and 141-142. 
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(a) Freedom from Contract and the Value of Personal Attachment 
 
Kimel’s first argument relies on the damage done to personal relationships and the 
value of personal attachment, by the effect that legal enforcement has on 
corrupting the motives of promisors, or by giving promisees the impression that 
the promisor is acting out of self-interest. The danger is that the expressive quality 
of making, relying on, and keeping promises will be lost, or ‘crowded out’.59 The 
argument has a distinctly ‘empirical cast’.60 It focuses on the effect that legal 
enforcement has on personal relationships.  
I follow Shiffrin in finding this type of argument unconvincing. There are 
at least two problems. First, Kimel does not present any empirical evidence which 
supports his claim that moral motivations would be displaced by legal incentives, 
or the claim that promisees would have this impression. Certainly, our experience 
of other legal domains suggests the contrary. As Shiffrin says:  
 
In the case of tort, there is little serious concern that legal 
regulations on bodily contact have come to dominate the motives 
of citizens or that citizens believe their safe passage across the 
                                                
59 Ibid, p 29. Cf M Sandel What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets 
(London: Allen Lane, 2012) who relies on this notion of corruption and crowding 
out to justify ethical limitations on the market. 
60 Shiffrin distinguishes between empirical and expressive versions of this type of 
argument. Shiffrin (2012), above n 9, pp 251-252. According to the expressive 
view, the damage is done by the message that the law sends out about the type of 
norms that should govern these relationships, rather than the effects of that 
message. Aditi Bagchi makes this type of argument in ‘Separating Contract and 
Promise’ (2010) 38 Florida State University Law Review 709.  
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streets is generally a matter attributable to law and not to basic 
civic decency.61  
 
It is quite possible that the law is only providing a ‘backstop’ to reassure 
promisees, in case the motivations that normally govern the practice of promising 
fail.62 
 It is beyond the scope of this article to review the empirical evidence that 
does exist. Although there is some empirical support for the existence of crowding 
out,63 there are studies that go in the other direction, and which show that notions 
of fairness and reciprocity play a significant role in explaining contractual 
performance.64  
Even if, arguendo, the empirical effects Kimel describes are shown to 
exist, there is a second problem. It might be possible, Shiffrin argues, to manage 
these effects. So, for example, to prevent the corruption of motives, or the 
perception of such corruption, the courts could make clear that the purpose of 
                                                
61 Shiffrin (2012), above n 9, p 253. 
62 Ibid. Cf L Fuller The Law in Quest of Itself (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) p 137: 
‘… the effective deterrents which shape the average man’s conduct derive from 
morality, from a sense of right and wrong’; and S Macaulay ‘Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28 American Sociological 
Review 55 at 65-66.   
63 G Charness ‘Responsibility and Effort in an Experimental Labor Market’ 
(2000) 42 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 375 at 375; I Bohnet, B 
Frey and S Huck ‘More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, 
and Crowding’ (2001) 95 American Political Science Review 131 at 132; U 
Gneezy and A Rustichini ‘A Fine is a Price’ (2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 1 
at 3; C Mellström and M Johannesson ‘Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was 
Titmuss Right?’ (2008) 6 Journal of the European Economic Association 845. 
64 E Fehr, S Gächter and G Kirchsteiger ‘Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement 
Device’ (1997) 65 Econometrica 833; M Dufwenberg and G Kirchsteiger ‘A 
Theory of Sequential Reciprocity’ (2004) 47 Games and Economic Behavior 268 
at 290-291; D Levine ‘Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments’ 
(1998) 1 Review of Economic Dynamics 593 at 595; Macaulay, above n 62, at 64.  
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contractual remedies is merely to provide a backstop, and not to displace 
relational motives.65  
As well as the assumptions that Kimel makes about the effects of contract 
on promise, he also makes assumptions about the effects of the moral practice of 
promising on individual acts of making, relying on, and keeping promises. He 
assumes that social pressure, unlike legal pressure, won’t ordinarily affect the 
relational motivations and attitudes that should govern promising. It is unclear that 
this is true, or at least that there should be an asymmetry in this context between 
legal and social pressure. Depending on the community, there may be significant 
social pressure to keep one’s word.66 Moreover, there is empirical evidence 
showing that the reputational damage done by breach, and the chance that future 
co-operation will be endangered, are significant reasons motivating 
                                                
65 Shiffrin (2012), above n 9, pp 253-254.  
66 A Schwartz and R Scott ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’ 
(2003) 113 Yale Law Journal 541 at 557: ‘reputations work best in small trading 
communities, especially those with ethnically homogenous members, where 
everything that happens soon becomes common knowledge, and boycotts of bad 
actors are easy to enforce’. Citing J Landa ‘A Theory of the Ethnically 
Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law’ 
(1981) 10 The Journal of Legal Studies 349. There are no doubt cultural 
differences at play too. The importance that the French attach to keeping one’s 
promises may be one of the reasons for the significant divergences that exist 
between English and French contract law. French contract law attaches enormous 
importance to upholding the agreement, which is reflected in key doctrines, such 
as the greater availability of specific performance and damages for cost of cure 
and non-pecuniary loss, the enforceability of penalty clauses, restrictions on the 
right to terminate and the absence of a duty to mitigate loss. See S Rowan 
Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Analysis of the Protection of 
Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); L Miller ‘Specific 
Performance in the Common and Civil Law: Some Lessons for Harmonisation’ in 
P Giliker (ed) Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment: Anglo-Canadian 
Perspectives (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) p 281; L Miller 
‘Penalty Clauses in England and France: A Comparative Study’ (2004) 53 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 79. 
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performance.67 In such a context, it may be that people keep their promises for 
fear of the negative reactions others have towards breach, or at least it may be that 
this is the perception of promisees. This might displace relational motives and 
attitudes, just as much as Kimel argues that legal pressure does.  
In conclusion, Kimel does not show that legal enforcement necessarily 
undermines the expressive quality of promising, and nor is it clear that absent 
legal enforcement promise has this expressive quality anyway. Therefore, Kimel’s 
claim that the Balfour doctrine promotes freedom from contract is unconvincing.   
 
(b) Freedom to Contract and the Value of Personal Detachment 
 
There are problems too with Kimel’s argument that the Balfour doctrine promotes 
freedom to contract and the value of personal detachment. There are three 
interconnected difficulties. First, it is not obvious that it offers a plausible 
interpretation of contract law. Second, I doubt that personal detachment has value. 
And, third, it is unclear that personal detachment is even possible in the 
contractual context.  
 
(i) Is contract based on personal detachment?  
 
First, it is unclear that contract law is a realm of detachment. My point is not the 
same as that which has been made by relational contract theory, according to 
                                                
67 B Klein and K Leffler ‘The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 
Performance’ (1981) 89 The Journal of Political Economy 615 at 616; L Bernstein 
‘Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent 
Business Norms’ (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1765 at 
1787-1788; Macaulay, above n 62, at 55 and 64.  
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which some, many or even most contracts involve relationships, with the result 
that relational norms might in certain cases displace, or at least shape (qualify, 
defeat, reinforce, supplement, and so forth) contractual norms.68 Kimel deals with 
relational contract theory not by doubting how many contracts have relational 
elements, but rather by insisting that contract gives parties the freedom to allow 
relational norms to play these roles if they want them to. Parties can insist that 
contractual norms govern, and in some cases, the existence of that freedom may 
actually facilitate the emergence and success of close relationships:  
 
[I]t is the very fact that the contract provides for some more or less 
certain, enforceable fundamentals, that liberates the parties from 
dependence on the creation or maintenance of personal relations 
for the realisation of such fundamentals; and this liberty, in turn, is 
often indispensable in enabling the parties to develop, possibly 
over time, a relationship that far transcends that set of legally 
binding rights and duties which the contract constituted or recorded 
in the first place.69  
 
So, for example, in the context of academic employment:  
 
A dean, for instance, or head of department, would likely find 
herself rather inhibited in her efforts to develop an informal 
                                                
68 See I Macneil ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ (1973) 47 University of 
Southern California Law Review 691; C Goetz and R Scott ‘Principles of 
Relational Contracts’ (1981) 67 Virginia Law Review 1089; M Eisenberg 
‘Relational Contracts’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and Fault 
in Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p 291.  
69 Kimel, above n 8, p 83. 
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friendship with a new appointee, if she knows that their 
interactions invariably lead to understandings or expectations 
pertaining to those issues that formal contract settles.70  
 
Kimel’s response to relational contract theory is fine as far as it goes, but it fails to 
address a related but altogether more radical critique. It is problematic to claim 
that detachment is the prevalent mode of contract law, not because relational 
norms displace or supervene on contractual norms, but rather because it is unclear 
that contractual norms uphold the value of detachment.  
This is a deeper point that emerged from Lon Fuller’s work in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and in particular his broader response to Herbert Hart’s The Concept of 
Law.71 Its significance was blurred in the 1970s by Ian Macneil’s work, and the 
ensuing runaway success of relational contract theory.72 Fuller’s central claim was 
that contract norms, ie, the rules, doctrines, principles, and so forth, that govern 
the practice of making and keeping promises and agreements are driven by 
relational considerations, and far from promoting detachment, actually promote 
attachment.  
This connects with the scepticism expressed earlier that contractual 
enforcement necessarily disrupts the expressive quality and relational significance 
                                                
70 Ibid, p 85. 
71 HLA Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); L Fuller 
‘Freedom: A Suggested Analysis’ (1944) 68 Harvard Law Review 1305; L Fuller 
The Morality of Law (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, rev edn, 
1969); L Fuller ‘Human Interaction and the Law’ (1969) 14 The American 
Journal of Jurisprudence 1. For a recent articulation of the implications of these 
views for debates in general jurisprudence see N Simmonds Law as a Moral Idea 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
72 See his seminal paper ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’: Macneil, above n 68. 
Fuller’s point was not completely submerged; it resurfaced and found its clearest 
expression in Charles Fried’s Contract as Promise in 1981, above n 48.  
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of promising. It may merely provide a backstop of reassurance for the promisee, 
in case the ordinary motivations that should preside over the practice fail.  
 Other structural features of contracting support this relational 
interpretation of the practice. Fuller placed particular emphasis on the centrality of 
negotiation or bargaining in contract. Successful negotiation requires an 
accommodation of potentially conflicting interests. Parties have to be prepared to 
engage sympathetically with each other, and indeed to reveal to one another 
something about their interests and desires, and the weight that each attaches to 
them. Agreement will not be reached without at least some degree of give and 
take: 
 
[T]he creation of a complex contractual relationship through 
explicit negotiations requires a certain attitude of mind and spirit on 
the part of the participants… Each must seek to understand why the 
other makes the demands he does even as he strives to resist or 
qualify those demands… Explicit bargaining involves, then, an 
uneasy blend of collaboration and resistance.73 
 
By engaging in this process, the parties do not of course become friends, but nor 
are they strangers. They become Fuller said ‘friendly strangers’.74 Similarly, Fried 
                                                
73 L Fuller ‘The Role of Contract in the Ordering Processes of Society Generally’ 
in K Winston (ed) The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L 
Fuller (Oxford: Hart, rev edn, 2002) p 187 at p 203. And see: Fuller (1969) 
‘Human Interaction and the Law’, above n 71, at 28-29; Fuller ‘Irrigation and 
Tyranny’ in K Winston (ed), p 207 at pp 220-221. 
74 Fuller (1969) ‘Human Interaction and the Law’, above n 71, at 27.  
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says that contracting parties are ‘neighbors rather than strangers’.75 There is a type 
of association here that is not captured by the dichotomy between close relations 
(friends, intimates, etc) and strangers.76  
This spirit of cooperation does not cease when bargaining comes to an end. 
When parties reach agreement, they repose trust in one another and embark on a 
joint project whereby to achieve their aims each has to assist the other.77 This 
feature of the practice creates room for seriously doubting the relevance of 
personal detachment. How can parties be said to be detached from one another, 
when, first and foremost, they have to trust and depend on one another for the 
pursuit of their respective ends?78 Trust is essential for assurance and reliance; 
otherwise the agreement is based merely on predictions about what the other will 
do.79  
These relational norms and moral attitudes play a central role in explaining 
not only how contracts are formed, but also how they are interpreted, vitiated and 
remedied when they are broken. So, for example, even business transactions, 
Fuller argued, might involve relations of ‘heavy and complex interdependence’.80 
Parties may have to make reasonable adjustments in the light, for example, of 
technological advancements: ‘Here fidelity to explicit contractual commitments 
must be tempered by a sense of reciprocal dependence and a willingness to meet 
unexpected developments in a spirit of cooperation’.81  
                                                
75 C Fried ‘The Convergence of Contract and Promise’ (2007) 120 Harvard Law 
Review Forum 1 at 8. 
76 Fuller (1969) ‘Human Interaction and the Law’, above n 71, at 27-28. 
77 Fried (1981), above n 48, p 8; Fried (2007), above n 75, at 8. 
78 Fuller (1944), above n 71, at 1313; Fried (1981), above n 48, p 13. 
79 Fried (1981), above n 48, pp 8 and 13. 
80 Fuller (2002), above n 73, p 200. 
81 Ibid, p 201. See also Fried (1981), above n 48, p 89.  
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The efficacy of contract as a mechanism of social order depends on a 
recognition of these realities, and indeed they are reflected in the cannons of 
contractual interpretation.82 I cannot go into the details here, but plausibly, these 
relations of trust and mutual dependency explain other central contract doctrines, 
such as undue influence,83 unconscionability, and economic duress,84 the duty to 
mitigate (which Fried has argued is an altruistic duty triggered by the relationship 
between the parties),85 and restrictions on the right to affirm for repudiatory 
breach.86  
In conclusion, it is unclear that the institutional features of contract law, 
such as legal enforcement, and contractual rules and doctrines support Kimel’s 
claim that the mark of contract is personal detachment.  
 
(ii) Is personal detachment a value?  
 
The purpose of the last section was interpretive: to cast doubt on Kimel’s claim 
that the best way to understand contract law is through the prism of the value of 
personal detachment. In this section, I shall make a more radical claim. I doubt 
that an interpretation of contract law in terms of personal detachment even gets off 
                                                
82 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (No 1) 
[1998] 1 All ER 98 at 114-115 (Lord Hoffmann); L Schuler AG v Wickman 
Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 at 251; Pink Floyd Music v EMI Records 
[2010] EWHC 533 at [55].  
83 M Chen-Wishart ‘Undue Influence: Vindicating Relationships of Influence’ 
(2006) 59 CLP 231. 
84  A Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 3rd edn, 2004) p 664. 
85 Fried (2007), above n 75, at 8. Explaining the altruistic nature of the duty, Fried 
says: ‘[A] promise may call for sacrifices far in excess of what residual, 
background nonpromissory principles of fairness and decency require’. Fried 
(1981), above n 48, p 131. 
86 MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2015] EWHC 
283 (imposing a good faith restriction on the right to affirm).  
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the ground, because it is far from clear that personal detachment has any value at 
all.  
Kimel says that, in the contractual context, the value of personal 
detachment consists in the ability to enter into exchanges with other people, 
without having to be in a pre-existing relationship with them, and without having 
to commit to entering such a relationship in the future.87 He says that it is a value 
that is ‘diametrically opposed’ to the value of personal relationships, which is the 
value that animates promising. Like the value of personal relationships, personal 
detachment has intrinsic value, which he argues is ‘easy to see’.88  
Contra Kimel, that value is far from being easy to see. The difficulty is 
related to Fuller’s concerns about Mill’s theory of freedom:  
 
Mill seems to assume that the ideal condition would be one in 
which, unhampered by social arrangements of any kind, the 
individual would, in effect, choose everything for himself – his 
satisfactions, his mode of life, his relations with others. Only the 
unfortunate circumstance that his actions may impinge harmfully 
on others makes it necessary to qualify this ideal.89 
 
This is a negative, distinctly English, conception of freedom, according to which 
‘freedom means primarily privacy’, or ‘the right to be let alone’. Fuller contrasted 
                                                
87 Kimel, above n 8, p 78. 
88 Ibid, p 79.  
89 Fuller (1944), above n 71, at 1310. Fuller’s works on freedom are largely 
forgotten. Thank you to Dan Priel for bringing them to my attention. D Priel ‘Lon 
Fuller’s Political Jurisprudence of Freedom’ (2014) 10 Jerusalem Review of Legal 
Studies 1. 
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it with the American, more positive, version, where freedom entails involvement 
in social and political life.90  
Fuller could not see the value in being left totally alone. He calls this 
‘freedom in a void’, deriding its ‘worthlessness’. He used Chester Barnard’s 
example of a solitary rower adrift in the centre of a foggy lake to make his point:  
 
Such a man is utterly free to row in any direction he sees fit. He is 
even free from the burden of decision, since he is in a situation 
where it is impossible to reach any intelligent decision as to the 
direction he should take. Completely without shackles, duties or 
obligations, such a man ought to feel free – if to be free is to be 
unfettered by restraints.91  
 
But of course he is not free in any meaningful way.92 Freedom, Fuller argued, of 
the kind we value requires ‘effective participation in the affairs of the family, the 
tribe, or the nation’.93 It depends on background social institutions, which channel 
our creative energies. He used the right to vote as an example. A freedom which 
depends on ‘a machinery of election’: 
 
This machinery will in turn carry with it its own compulsions, for 
instance, against voting twice. Not only that, but the forms through 
                                                
90 L Fuller ‘The Case Against Freedom’ in K Winston (ed), above n 73, p 315 at p 
323, citing Hart who brought out the contrast after his visit to Harvard between 
1956-1957; HLA Hart ‘A View of America’ (16 January 1958) The Listener 89; L 
Fuller ‘Freedom as a Problem of Allocating Choice’ (1968) 112 Proceedings of 
the American Philosophical Society 101 at 103. 
91 Fuller (2002), above n 90, p 321. 
92 Fuller (1944), above n 71, at 1312. 
93 Fuller (1968), above n 90, at 103; Fuller (2002), above n 90, p 320.  
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which choice is channeled by an election law will of necessity 
exclude other forms of choice. Thus, if the election is to be by the 
system known as proportional representation (PR), the electorate 
must necessarily forego the form of choice involved in election by 
a simple majority.94  
 
For Fuller, there are a battery of social forms behind the exercise of any valuable 
freedom. Kimel does not endorse a negative conception of freedom, preferring 
instead Joseph Raz’s view of freedom as personal autonomy, or the ‘ideal of self-
creation, of people exerting control over their destinies’, by freely choosing and 
pursuing valuable ‘activities, goals and relationships’. As a matter of political 
philosophy, government should create the conditions for autonomy, by making 
such options available, and respect the decisions that citizens make about how to 
live.95  
Nevertheless, Kimel does support making personal detachment available 
as a valuable option in people’s lives. In doing so, he links detachment to the 
value of freedom, and opens himself up to Fuller’s critique of Mill. Absent 
restraint, freedom is not worth the candle.96 Thus, far from being dependent on 
personal detachment, the value of freedom is inimical to it. 
 
                                                
94 Fuller (1944), above n 71, at 1312. 
95 Kimel, above n 8, p 126. 
96 Fuller (2002), above n 90, pp 319-320; Fuller (1944), above n 71, at 1311-1312: 
‘The complex network of institutional ways by which the bulk of our energies is 
directed and channeled is not an unfortunate limitation on freedom. It is essential 
to freedom itself’; Fuller (1968), above n 90, at 102-103; L Fuller ‘Law as an 
Instrument of Social Control and Law as a Facilitation of Human Interaction’ 
(1975) 89 Brigham Young University Law Review 89 at 89-90; Priel, above n 89, 
at 23.  
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(iii) Is personal detachment possible?  
 
It follows from what I have said above that I doubt whether personal detachment 
in any meaningful sense is actually possible. One might reply that though this 
appears to be true in the case of the solitary rower, there are other cases that 
plausibly indicate that personal detachment has value. Timothy Macklem has 
argued that privacy or personal detachment has value in the context of artistic 
expression, such as the writing of poetry. It enables certain forms of creativity, 
which shape and express character:  
 
It is in isolation from other people, and the supports they offer and 
the freedoms they make possible, that a person is forced to 
confront the constraints of his or her circumstances, as best he or 
she can, with whatever resources, personal and practical, he or she 
cannot only call upon but develop, through the exercise of his or 
her imagination, strength and will, in short, through the exercise of 
creativity.97  
 
It sounds plausible that detachment has value in this context. However, it is 
important to bear in mind a point that Fuller made, which is that due to over 
familiarity, we have a tendency to take for granted, or overlook, the presence of 
social forms.98 Indeed, Macklem is quick to uncover some of these relations:  
                                                
97 T Macklem Independence of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) p 
67. 
98 Fuller (2002), above n 90, pp 323 and 325. There are ways though to bring the 
centrality of those forms to the fore. Samuel Scheffler asks us to imagine the 
implications of knowing that the entire human race would be wiped out soon after 
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Even poetry… one of the purest expressions of individual 
consciousness and endeavour, is a recognized social form in itself 
and relies upon structures that are intelligible and accessible to its 
audience, be they sonnet forms or free verse. Poetry also depends 
upon a literary culture, in the form of publishers, reviewers, 
booksellers and readers, for the achievement of its purpose, and 
full realization of its value.99 
 
Poetry depends on social forms. However, it may be that the background 
existence of these forms means that there is space for a form of personal 
detachment in poetry, and perhaps other forms of artistic expression. Whatever the 
case might be in these contexts, it’s clear there is no such possibility for 
detachment in contract. Contracts are inherently relational. As I have argued, 
contractual parties depend on each other to achieve their ends. Unlike poetry, that 
dependence is upfront and of immediate concern to both of the parties. Contra 
Kimel, it is the relation and not the threat of legal enforcement, which merely 
provides a backstop, which is central.  
 
(iv) Summary   
 
                                                                                                                                 
we die. Many activities such as music or academic research would lose their value 
he argues because they presuppose the persistence of human institutions and 
practices. S Scheffler Death and the Afterlife N Kolodny (ed) (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
99 Macklem, above n 97, p 37. 
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In summary, I have challenged Kimel’s divisionist defence of the Balfour 
doctrine. I doubt that a contracting party’s right to decide whether a promise 
should be legally binding promotes attachment or freedom from contract, because 
it is not clear legal enforcement would necessarily disrupt the expressive quality 
of promising. Nor is it evident that the intent to contract doctrine promotes 
personal detachment or freedom to contract. It is far from obvious, for the reasons 
Fuller gives, that this is a value worth serving, or that contract law does or even 
could serve it.  
The underlying problem with Kimel’s approach is that it reinforces the 
Balfour contrast between the personal and commercial sphere. The assumption is 
that personal relations involve attachment, and a lack of constraint, whilst in the 
commercial realm people are detached, and constrained by the mechanism of legal 
enforcement. The contrast is false, and, as feminists have shown, potentially 
highly damaging. It is based on a mistaken conception of freedom. As Fuller 
argued, the value of freedom involves attachment and that depends on a morality 
of constraint. Social forms facilitate valuable human interaction by subjecting the 
pursuit of our ends to the recognition of our common humanity.100 There is no 
separation between contract and promise. They are both forms of attachment, and 
they both involve constraint. The divisionist obscures this reality, and crudely 
restricts the possibilities for human association.  
                                                
100 As Fried says, this is a principle of natural law: ‘[B]y the norm of human 
nature a person in his dealings with others may not deny either his own or any 
other person’s capacity for free and rational action. To do so is always to act 
irrationally – that is, a failure to make a true judgment of reality the ground for 
one’s acts – and therefore to act contrary to one’s nature’. C Fried ‘Natural Law 
and the Concept of Justice’ (1964) 74 Ethics 237 at 248. See also Fried (1978), 
above n 47, p 29; Fuller (1975), above n 96, at 89. 
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Fuller saw that there exists a spectrum of human relations: ‘running from 
intimacy, at the one end, to hostility, at the other, with a stopping place midway 
that can be described as the habitat of friendly strangers’.101 That realm of friendly 
strangers includes contractual relations. It is a different kind of relation to 
friendship or love, but nevertheless it is premised on trust and attachment. We lose 
sight of this at our peril. Commenting on this divisionist picture, Unger says: ‘The 
most remarkable feature of this vision is its exclusion of the more morally 
ambitious models of human connection from the prosaic activities and institutions 
that absorb most people most of the time’. 102  Contract is, primarily, an 
opportunity for human association, rather than an escape from it.   
The dichotomy threatens both the possibility of intimacy, by, as feminists 
have argued, creating relations of dependency and need rather than equality and 
respect, and the neighbourly relations that underpin contract. For these reasons, it 
should be rejected. Does this mean abandoning the intent to contract doctrine too? 
It does not. That doctrine can be accommodated within the framework of the 
reflective view of contract.  
 
5. THE REFLECTIVE VISION 
 
(a) Kimel’s Challenge  
 
The promise theory or reflective view of contract seems, as I have said, to struggle 
with the intent to contract doctrine. If contracts are promises, it is unclear why 
                                                
101 Fuller (1969) ‘Human Interaction and the Law’, above n 71, at 27. Fried 
(1978), above n 47, p 30. Cf C Dalton ‘An Essay in the Deconstruction of 
Contract Doctrine’ (1985) 94 Yale Law Journal 997 at 1098-1100.  
102 Unger, above n 23, at 623.  
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seriously intended promises should not be contracts, whether or not there was a 
further intention to create legal relations. Kimel puts the challenge in the 
following way:  
 
For the “separate requirement” of an intention to create legal 
relations to be significant or even explicable, it should be possible 
to think of a reason why not to have such an intention in the 
relevant circumstances, or at least why not to ascribe it 
systematically to rational agents (in these circumstances)… And if 
it is thought that there is no pertinent difference between 
contractual and promissory relations, and even more so if the 
former are thought to be but an improved version of the latter – if 
contracts are understood to offer all the benefits of promises (or 
exchanges of promises) with the additional bonus of enforceability 
– then the chances of finding such reasons look rather slim.103  
 
In other words, Kimel asks what does the reflective view have to lose? If contracts 
are promises, there seem to be only upsides to legal recognition, ie, the additional 
assurance provided by legal enforcement. In this section, I want to respond to 
Kimel’s challenge. As well as the upsides, there are downsides to contracts, even 
if contracts are indeed promises.   
 
(b) Pluralism and the Determinatio  
 
                                                
103 Kimel, above n 8, p 137. 
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Historically, it has been a feature of positivist thinking about the nature of law to 
focus on its coercive nature. This, together with the idea of the sovereign, creates 
a ‘top down’ model of the law, which loses sight of the moral value of the 
relations that the law facilitates.104 As Fuller said, the law is not just ‘a system of 
minimum restraints designed to keep the bad man in check, but is in fact helping 
to create a body of common morality which will define the good man’.105 
In the contractual context, Kimel too focuses on the reassurance that legal 
enforcement provides, and the detachment this creates between the parties. What 
this misses is the moral quality of the relations that contract law structures. There 
are two in particular: the relations between the contracting parties and those 
between the parties and the state.  
The relations between the contracting parties are based on promise and 
trust. As Fried said, when we make a promise we invite trust, and when that 
promise is accepted we are trusted to do what we say. Breaking a promise is an 
abuse of trust, which shows a lack of respect for the promisee.106 The sense that 
relations based on trust are what are at stake here is brought out by a homely 
example used by Seana Shiffrin:  
 
It is not uncommon, as many of us know, for plumbers or 
contractors to commit to appear to do a job but then fail to appear. 
You wait for hours, they don’t call, and then you must reschedule 
and wait again, apprehensive that the scene will recur. Most people 
                                                
104 There are of course positivist thinkers, like Hart, who are exceptions, but the 
claim here has Hobbes, Austin and Kelsen in mind. C Fried An Anatomy of 
Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1970) pp 249-250; Fuller (1966), above n 62, p 137. 
105 Fuller (1966), above n 62, p 137. 
106 Fried (1981), above n 48, pp 16-17. 
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who are subject to this sort of treatment are enraged. I find those 
who are not enraged a little alien: they seem either sedated or to 
have made a heavy investment in honing their meditative 
techniques.107  
 
The source of that anger is not just the fact that you have not received the service 
you were promised and the inconvenience this causes. Imagine for example that 
the plumber called in advance to warn you that he was not going to make it, he got 
a better job elsewhere, but that quite fortuitously at that very same moment 
another plumber knocks on your door to say that he can do the job for the very 
same price. You might feel less angry, but I suspect that for most people there 
would still be some residual resentment towards the first plumber. Although you 
receive the service you were expecting, you do not receive it from the first 
plumber. He has let you down; abused your trust. You might be less likely to hire 
that plumber again, regardless of whatever assurance legal enforcement provides. 
This is because trust provides a firmer ground for acts of reliance, than the shifting 
sands of self-interest.108  
This is why Fried says ‘a contract is first of all a promise’.109 Note though, 
Fried does not say that a contract is only a promise.110 The claim is that contracts 
                                                
107 Shiffrin uses the example to illustrate that usually when we make promises 
they are not promises to perform or pay the monetary equivalent of performance, 
rather the expectation is that we will perform what we promised. So the example 
continues: ‘If the no-show plumber were to appear next time matter-of-factly 
presenting you with a check or a discount reflecting the value of your time that 
was wasted, I suspect that, after emerging from shock, the resentment would not 
fully dissipate’. S Shiffrin ‘Could Breach of Contract be Immoral?’ (2008) 107 
Michigan Law Review 1551 at 1564. 
108 Fried (1981), above n 48, pp 8 and 13. 
109 Ibid, p 17. Similarly Shiffrin says that promise is ‘the fundamental component 
of a contract’. See Shiffrin (2008), above n 107, at 1551-1552. 
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are promises, not that all promises are contracts.111 The two practices, contract and 
promise, are both based on promise, but it is possible to differentiate them. This 
creates space for choice. There may be reasons for preferring one practice over the 
other and vice versa. Here are the seedlings of a response to Kimel’s challenge.  
How are they differentiated? Promise, unlike contract, is what I shall call 
an ‘open’ or largely underdetermined system of norms. This is due to the 
existence of what I call ‘interpretive’ and ‘value pluralism’.112 By interpretive 
pluralism, I mean that there is an irreducible plurality of ways in which to 
interpret values. Values that bear on promising include promise, altruism, fairness, 
corrective justice, and so on. When we make a promise, it is fairly clear what we 
should do. Having made a promise, we now have an obligation to keep it, or to do 
what we said we would do. The existence of this fundamental norm of promising 
is pretty uncontroversial. However, due to interpretive pluralism, many of the 
other requirements of the practice are much less clear, and to a large degree 
dependent on context.  
So, for example, it is far less clear what the promise principle requires 
when a promise is broken. To a fairly large degree it will depend on the nature and 
history of the relationship we have with the promisee and the context. If I promise 
my daughter that I will go to the cinema with her on Tuesday, but end up breaking 
that promise, because, say, I get stuck in traffic, it is not obvious what promissory 
logic now requires. Some people say promise or the interests it protects require 
                                                                                                                                 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid.  
112 I argue for the relevance of these concepts for debates about the legitimacy of 
transnational contract law in my paper ‘The Convergence of Contract Law in 
Europe and the Problem of Legitimacy: A Common Lawyer’s Perspective’ (2016) 
12 European Review of Contract Law 96 at 102-111. 
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me to perform my promise at the next available opportunity.113 I am far less sure. 
What if instead of offering to go to the next showing of the movie, I buy a DVD 
of another movie for us to watch together at home, or I suggest we go for dinner, 
or I say ‘I am really sorry’ and leave it at that? Although promise requires me to 
do something when I breach, it is not clear that any of these potential responses 
necessarily has priority over any of the others.114 Instead, the parties have to 
decide between themselves which response is most appropriate.  
This is not to say promissory morality exerts no influence on which option 
to take. So, for example, it might rule out some obviously inappropriate responses 
to my breach, such as agreeing to take my daughter on an all expenses world trip. 
The point is only that there is no uniquely appropriate response, but rather a range 
of rationally defensible courses of action.115  
Another source of indeterminacy in promise is value pluralism. According 
to value pluralism, there are an irreducible plurality of moral values and no single 
correct way of resolving conflict between them. Rather, there exist a multiplicity 
of legitimate rankings.116 So, for example, imagine I promise to drive my friend to 
the airport tomorrow so he can make a flight. However, I forget to set my alarm 
clock and my friend misses the flight. When I failed to turn up, my friend could 
easily have taken a taxi to the airport, but instead chose to stay at home and wait 
for me. How should I feel about my friend missing the flight? Should I feel 
                                                
113 Shiffrin (2007), above n 4, at 724; Rowan, above n 66, pp 118-120; Kimel, 
above n 8, p 95; J Gardner ‘What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective 
Justice’ (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 1 at 28-29. 
114 Cf J Tasioulas ‘Human Rights, Legitimacy, and International Law’ (2013) 58 
The American Journal of Jurisprudence 1 at 20; A Buchanan ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Law’ in S Besson and J Tasioulas (eds) The Philosophy of 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p 95. Discussing the 
multiple ways in which human rights might be interpreted.  
115 Thank you to Fred Wilmot-Smith for helping me to clarify this point.  
116 For a general discussion of the thesis see Tasioulas, above n 114, at 19.  
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guilty? Or perhaps angry that he did not call a taxi? What should I do? Say 
‘sorry’? Tell my friend off? Offer to pay the cost of the flight?  
These and many other normative questions arise. There are a multiplicity 
of values that bear on the situation, including promise, corrective justice, fairness, 
altruism, friendship, and so on. Those values might conflict. So, for example, 
corrective justice might require me to compensate my friend for missing the flight. 
However, fairness might require my friend to take some share of the 
responsibility.117 According to value pluralism, there is no single correct answer.  
How the parties interpret these values, and how they navigate and resolve 
conflicts between them, will say something about the weight they attach to the 
values at stake and the character of their relationship; indeed, it will shape it. As 
Fried says:  
 
It is clear enough that after we have taken care to render to others 
their fair share and have taken care also to avoid doing wrong, 
there remains during the whole course of our lives a large measure 
of discretion. In filling this discretionary space we make a life 
which is characteristically our own.118  
  
The source of that ‘discretionary space’ is the existence of interpretive and value 
pluralism. In contrast to promise, contract manages pluralism in a different way. It 
is a ‘closed’ or largely determined system of norms. By this I mean that the 
decisions about the interpretation and ranking of values that are left to the parties 
                                                
117 For an argument that it does see G Letsas and P Saprai ‘Mitigation, Fairness 
and Contract Law’ in G Klass, G Letsas and P Saprai (eds), above n 1, p 319. 
118 Fried (1978), above n 47, p 167.  
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themselves in the context of promise, are authoritatively settled for the parties by 
legal institutions, such as courts and legislatures.  
For natural lawyers, this is the key function of law.119 On account of 
interpretive and value pluralism, many of the requirements of natural law are too 
vague to provide practical guidance. They have to be concretised by systems of 
positive law. They call this role the determinatio.120  
In the context of promise, it is contract law that fleshes out the 
requirements of natural law. As I have said, there are a number of perfectly 
eligible ways that those requirements might be interpreted and balanced. So, for 
example, English law embraces the requirement that on breach of contract, the 
promisee has a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate the loss by for example 
obtaining substitute performance. In doing so, English law attaches priority to 
non-promissory values, such as altruism, loss avoidance or fairness.121 In contrast, 
French law eschews the existence of such a requirement, thus attaching greater 
weight to the duty to perform one’s promises.122 Neither interpretation of the 
practice is necessarily wrong. They are both rationally defensible interpretations 
and rankings of the values at stake.  
                                                
119  Fried (1970), above n 104, p 122: ‘[T]he function of concretizing the 
constraints of justice is the most characteristic function of law’.  
120 J Waldron ‘Torture, Suicide and Determinatio’ (2010) 55 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 1 at 2 and 9-10; J Finnis ‘On “The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement”’ (1985) 30 American Journal of Jurisprudence 21 at 43; Fried (1970), 
above n 104, pp 121-122.  
121 For a critique of this choice see Shiffrin (2007), above n 4, at 725. For a 
defence of the English position see Letsas and Saprai, above n 117, p 319 (relying 
on the principle of fairness); Fried, above n 75, at 7-8 (relying on altruism); C 
Goetz and R Scott ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of 
Contractual Obligation’ (1983) 69 Virginia Law Review 967 at 973 (defending 
loss avoidance as the rational). 
122 See Rowan, above n 66, pp 147- 151. 
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Whichever way the law chooses to interpret the practice, it facilitates or 
provides a framework for a new type of relation. Participants are given the choice, 
through the intent to contract doctrine, of having their relation governed or 
structured by the largely open or underdetermined practice of promising, or the 
relatively closed or determinate system of contract law. How they choose depends 
on the circumstances and what sort of relation they want. Do they want greater 
flexibility and room for manoeuvre or would they prefer the certainty and 
predictability of bright line rules?123 Do they want greater control over the rules 
that govern their interaction, or would they prefer for this to be out of their 
hands?124 And so on. There are advantages and disadvantages here that need to be 
weighed up. So, for example, flexibility is preferable where the future is difficult 
to predict. Flexibility avoids the costs of renegotiating contracts due to change of 
circumstances. However, flexibility has its drawbacks too, such as lack of 
predictability, and the risk of moral hazard arising from the tendency of parties to 
interpret their agreements in ways that suit their own interests.125 
The value of this choice is all that the promise theory needs to respond to 
Kimel’s challenge. Despite the advantages of legal enforcement, the parties might 
quite reasonably prefer to have their relation structured by the practice of 
promising rather than contract, because of the flexibility, freedom and opportunity 
for moral development that it provides. None of this means that contractual 
                                                
123 See Gilson, Sabel and Scott, above n 36, at 1391-1392. See also R Scott ‘The 
Death of Contract Law’ (2004) 54 University of Toronto Law Journal 369 at 372 
and 374.  
124 Robert Scott reports that in the US context, parties increasingly opt for less 
costly and more flexible informal enforcement: ‘The result is that the law of 
contract is suffering from stagnation and, even more embarrassingly, from 
irrelevance’. Scott, ibid, at 370.  
125 Gilson, Sabel and Scott, above n 36, at 1391-1392; Scott, above n 123, at 372, 
374 and 385-386; Macaulay, above n 62, at 64-65.  
 43 
relationships are not based on promise or trust. In the same way that the 
framework provided by the legal institution of marriage hardly indicates that those 
who marry do not love or trust one another.126 
 
(c) The Citizen and the State  
 
There is potentially another advantage to avoiding contract. For contract law, as 
well as providing a different kind of framework for the relationship between the 
parties themselves, one that is governed by a more rigid and determinate set of 
norms, also involves the parties in a relationship with the state.127  
That relationship, like any other, has its own distinctive set of what Fuller 
called ‘interactional expectancies’.128 In other words, it creates rights and duties 
for both parties. The state has authority over the contracting parties. It decides 
how to interpret and balance the values that govern their interaction. However, 
that power has to be exercised legitimately.129 In particular, the state must ensure 
that it treats its citizens with equal concern and respect in its decision-making, 
which includes a duty to publish its decisions and rules, and to act with principled 
consistency.130 In other words, the state must comply with the rule of law. In 
return, citizens have an obligation to obey the law.131 The relationship depends on 
reciprocity. As Fuller says: ‘If the lawgiver wants his subjects to accept and act by 
                                                
126 See Fried (1970), above n 104, pp 118-119.  
127 M Rosenfeld ‘Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract 
Law and Social Contract Theory’(1985) 70 Iowa Law Review 769 at 880-881. 
128 Fuller (1969) ‘Human Interaction and the Law’, above n 71, at 24 
129 Priel, above n 89, at 26.  
130 On the importance of the publication requirement for contracting parties see 
Scott, above n 123, at 379-380. 
131 See R Dworkin Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1986) ch 7; Fuller (1969) ‘Human Interaction and the Law’, above n 71, at 24-25. 
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his rules, he must himself display some minimum respect for those rules in his 
actions toward his subjects’.132 Despite its benefits, citizens might legitimately, at 
least in the context of promise, want to avoid this morally charged relationship; 
preferring instead to make decisions themselves. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have explored how the Balfour doctrine and the sophisticated 
defence of it given by Kimel has reinforced a damaging separation between 
contract and promise, which threatens both relationships of intimacy between the 
sexes, and the neighbourly relations which should underpin contract.  
The divisionist defence is based on a mistaken conception of freedom, 
according to which the value of freedom resides in the right to be let alone, and an 
undue focus on the coercive aspects of contract law, at the expense of the moral 
quality of the relationships that contract law structures.  
Freedom does not depend on an absence of constraint, but rather on social 
forms, such as promise and contract, which provide a framework for human 
interaction. Both of these practices are based on promise, but due to the different 
ways that they manage the pervasive influence of interpretive and value pluralism 
on our lives, they sustain different kinds of relation. Promissory relations are open 
and flexible, providing greater room for moral development. Contractual relations 
on the other hand are closed and relatively rigid, due not least to the constraints 
                                                
132 Fuller (2002), above n 73, p 190. See also J Boyle ‘Legal Realism and the 
Social Contract: Fuller's Public Jurisprudence of Form Private Jurisprudence of 
Substance’ (1992) 78 Cornell Law Review 371 at 377.  
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that the principle of fairness imposes on the relations between the citizen and the 
state that they necessarily involve. The difference in the moral quality of the 
relations that these two practices facilitate creates room for the promise theory to 
justify the existence of a separate intent to contract requirement, without having to 
let go of the view that promise is the foundation of contract.  
My aim has been to set out this alternative vision of contract. The values 
that underpin and sustain it, promise, trust, respect, attachment, human 
association, are the polar opposite of those that motivate the divisionist view. I 
have shown that the reflective view can accommodate the intent to contract 
doctrine. This does not yet though deal with the objections made by feminists 
about how the doctrine operates in practice. This is true, but it is important to see 
that the answer to the operational question depends on how the doctrine is 
justified in the first place. I cannot spell out all of the doctrinal or practical 
implications of the reflective view here. Instead, I have chosen to focus on the 
broader philosophical issues. I will though mention one very important 
implication.  
The dichotomy between contract and promise supports the evidential 
presumption against intent to contract in the context of promises made in the 
domestic or social sphere. If these promises were legally enforced that would, 
Kimel argues, threaten the expressive quality of promissory relations. I have 
questioned the plausibility of these claims. Moreover, this presumption is one that, 
as the feminist critique has shown, creates the risk of unfairness, distributive 
injustice, and relationships of dependency. Given these effects, that presumption 
is clearly incompatible with the values of trust, equality and respect that I have 
argued underpin both promise and contract. In light of this, whatever practical 
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benefits the presumption may have (resolving evidential difficulties, saving 
judicial time, and so on), they cannot justify interference with the principles of a 
morality of contract based on promise. It should go.  
 
 
